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Due to an increasing demand for collaborative robots, called “cobots”, in industrial 
settings, this study aims to predict the chance of accidents occurring due to the introduction of 
cobots in the Korean manufacturing industry determined by a risk model applied Bayesian belief 
network. This will suggest effective risk mitigation measures. This study focuses on the types of 
safety monitored stop, as well as distance and speed control which have a higher collision chance 
compared to the types of power and force limiting which allow for injury-free contact and that of 
hand guiding which allows the cobot to move itself only by clear user’s manipulation. 
The factors that impact annual accident probability are built on the grounds of the 
analysis of occupational injuries and fatalities by industrial robots. These factors were then 
categorized into human, organizational, and technical errors. Each factor’s probability was 
employed from the result of national statistics. If a probability was not available, notional 
probability was applied based on extensive literature reviews, and author’s experiences over 10 
years in the occupational safety and health fields due to it is scarce elsewhere. 
The risk model is constructed with two decision nodes - the employer’s and the 
policymaker’s view - and twelve uncertainty nodes. The model showed that the estimated annual 
accident probability was the same as the average accident rate of the entire manufacturing 
industry of the Republic of Korea in 2018. This could be interpreted as “average-risky”. 
Additionally, the influential factors were analyzed by a sensitivity analysis. By understanding 
which factors are highly influential, this study suggests three key measures to mitigate the risk by 
the introduction of cobots in the stages of design and manufacturing, installation, and usage. 
Researchers and OSH stakeholders may customize the model to assess the risk by the 
introduction of cobots. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction of industrial robots into manufacturing industries, mass production 
has increased (Long, Chevallereauo, Chablat, & Girin, 2018). Industrial robots take on tasks that 
are difficult or dangerous tasks for workers to do. However, industrial robots with great power 
and speed have intrinsic hazards and thus, have been operating in isolation from workers (Villani, 
Pini, Leali, & Secchi, 2018). Recently, collaborative robots, called “cobots” have been developed 
in order to work side-by-side with workers without being completely isolated. This means that 
cobots have an ability to control hazardous conditions and autonomously keep working (Audun, 
Trygve, Hisashi, & Mihoko, 2015). This ability helps meet the short-run production challenge 
which is connected to the issue about productivity improvement, faced by various small-medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs). This lowers the automation barrier tremendously (Zanchettin, Ceriani, 
Rocco, Ding, & Matthias, 2016).  
The world robotics report 2018 by International Federation Robotics (IFR), highlights 
how compact, efficient, user-friendly, and safe cobots are expected to be, as well as drive the 
automation market (IFR, 2018). In line with these trends, global robotics companies are 
launching various kinds of cobots in order to meet this demand, resulting in the decrease of the 
price of cobots and thus are affordable for SMEs (Friis & Officer, 2016). However, sharing a 
workplace with robots could allow for the risk of collision between them. Employees especially 
have a reluctance to work in close proximity with robots when they do not believe it is safe, even 
if all safety requirements of cobots are satisfied (You, Kim, Lee, Kamat, & Robert, 2018). 45% 
of workers in the Republic of Korea tend to feel unsafe working around cobots (Youngkook, 
Jinwoo, 2018). According to the IFR report, there are five leading markets occupying 73% of the 
world’s sales volume in 2017: China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and 
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Germany. Among those countries, the Republic of Korea has the highest robot densities by far 
(710 robots per 10,000 employees) in 2017. Given this density, an in-depth study in the Republic 
of Korea is related to the risk analysis by the introduction of cobots. 
 
Figure 1.1 Robot density growth: 2016 vs. 2017 (IFR 2018) 
In the upcoming years, the introduction of cobots in SMEs is expected to increase the 
relative vulnerability to occupational accidents compared to large-scale companies due to limited 
safety budget and manpower. Furthermore, the introduction of cobots may create previously 
unknown hazards and unexpected accidents (Youngkook, Jinwoo, 2018). Moreover, previous 
articles investigated that industrial robots have caused many accidents over the past years since 
their introduction (Vasic & Billard, 2103). At this point, one should ask for quantitative, direct 
evidence showing the quantity of accidents occurring from cobots or what causes allow for 
cobot-related accidents. Regrettably, such evidence is not available in the realm of occupational 
safety and health (OSH) and it is scarce elsewhere. Therefore, the objective of this current 
research is to predict the chance of cobot-related accidents occurring in the Korean 
manufacturing industry with a risk model applied Bayesian belief network. Moreover, it will also 
analyze which factors are the largest contributor to the annual accident probability and finally 




















CHAPTER 2.    SCOPE AND METHODS  
2.1 Scope 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, most of the current risk models for industrial robots do include 
various aspects: technical, environmental, human, and organizational factors. Moreover, issues 
about regulations, national characteristics, and stakeholder expectations need to be considered 
(Thieme & Utne, 2017). However, the scope of this study will not cover all these aspects into 
one risk model since various international standards such as ISO 10218 part 1, 2 and, 15066 were 
developed from the technical view for the safety of cobots. The major manufacturers follow 
these standards in the designing and manufacturing stage of cobots for safety. Moreover, most of 
the recent literatures with regards to the safety of cobots focus on improving the safety in areas 
such as control system and algorithm, sensors, and safety device performance which are an in-
depth knowledge in the technical side (Long et al., 2018; Michalos et al., 2015; Nikolakis, 
Maratos, & Makris, 2019; Vemula, Matthias, & Ahmad, 2018; Vogel, Walter, & Elkmann, 
2017). Therefore, this study will cover a different part of technical factors such as system 
reliability.  
 
   Figure 2.1 The scope of the risk model for this study 
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In the human and organization side, Thieme & Utne (2017) studied a quantitative risk 
model based on Bayesian belief network for human-robot collaboration performance on 
autonomous marine systems. You and Kim (2018) studied cognitive factors for improving the 
safety in human-robot collaboration, but only for workers in the construction industry. However, 
there is no previous study about a risk analysis with a quantitative approach by the introduction 
of cobots, centering on the human and organizational sides. Due to this lack of research, this 
study will cover the safety of cobots in the stage of usage and installation, considering the 
characteristics of human errors, organizational errors, and technical errors to some extent. 
 According to ISO 10218 part 1 and 2, there are four types of cobots. Firstly, Safety 
monitored stop: the robot stops if it detects a worker intruding into a certain pre-set work area. 
This type of cobots is often used for minimal collaborative work. Sensors that can detect if a 
worker enters or remains in a collaborative area are required. Secondly, distance and speed 
control: the robot can slow down its movements to a safe speed when an operator comes closer. 
Sensors that can detect the distance and the relative speed between humans and robots are 
required. Thirdly, hand guiding: the robot moves at limited speed following an explicit request 
for the operation. Sensors that can detect whether a worker is holding the manipulators or not are 
required. Fourthly, power and force limiting: the robot is specifically designed to allow for direct 
interaction with workers without physical safety fences, vision systems, or external scanners. 
Sensors that can detect contact forces between humans and robots are required. This cobot 
allows for injury-free contact between a worker and a cobot. 
The first three types of cobots are now available for high capacity robots, whereas the 
fourth type - power and force limiting - is mainly responsible for human and robot collaboration 
with a special concept.  According to ISO 15066, the main idea behind the fourth one is that they 
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shall not result in pain or injury in case of collision. This means that the cobots themselves are 
not a threat to workers if they work under the legislative regulations or international standards. 
The values of acting forces are adjusted in a way that makes it impossible to cause permanent 
injuries under the condition that the cobot does not use any dangerous tools such as cutters, 
electric burn, or shock (Michal, 2018). In addition, the hand guiding type can move itself only by 
clear user’s manipulation at an extremely limited speed so that the accident resulting in a low 
probability of accident from this type. 
However, in case of the first two types of cobots, it is predictable that there is a high 
chance of injuries and fatalities occurring like those of industrial robots. This is because the 
major difference in safety between industrial robots and these types of cobots is that the use of 
technical safeguards that isolate the robot from the workers and therefore eliminating the hazard 
is no longer applicable to collaborative human-robot systems (Jansen, A., van der Beek, D., 
Cremers, A., et al, 2018). To remove physical fences, the technology of reliable and robust 
virtual safety fences must be applied through safety cameras, proximity sensors, and 
photoelectronic curtains (IEC 61496-2,3,4) etc. Moreover, Distinguishing area such as worker 
only, robot only and collaboration or coexistence zone is very important. Research by Jansen, A., 
van der Beek, D., Cremers, A., et al (2018), shows that installing virtual cages or fences properly 
is crucial in place of physical cages in new industrial settings. Given this context, this paper will 
focus on the first two types of cobots: safety monitored stop and distance and speed control. 
2.2 Methods 
In order to design a risk model and calculate the estimated annual accident probability by 
the introduction of cobots, we are supposed to use a Software - the Netica version 6.05 
developed by Norsys Software Corp. - with the concept of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). To 
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construct a BBN, the following study used data where applicable, and when this data was not 
applicable, assumptions were based on the study of cobots and literature review to estimate.  
2.2.1 Bayesian belief network 
A Bayesian Belief Network or influence diagram visually models the probabilistic 
relationships among factors that have an impact on a final outcome, uncertainty on the grounds 
of the Bayes’ rule (Corcoran, Tran, & Levine, 2014; Heckerman, 1997). The Bayes’ theorem 








It expresses that P(A|B) is the posterior probability: conditional probability of an event A 
given an event B. P(B|A) is the likelihood: conditional probability of an event B given an event 
A. P(A) is prior probability. P(B) is the marginal probability or evidence. With this theorem, 
BBN helps make it feasible for modeling casual relationships among factors in combination with 
heterogeneous sources or with insufficient data sets (Uusitalo, 2007). BBN has been widely used 
for supporting decision-making in the diverse fields such as scientific prognosis and risk analysis 
(Fan & Yu, 2004; Heckerman, Mamdani, & Wellman, 1995).  
BBN is drawn with an acyclic graph called “nodes” that is typical of random variables 
and arrows that represent their dependencies in Figure 2.2. When two nodes are linked by an 
arrow, the one with a starting point is called “parent node” and the other one is called “child 
node”. Parent node conditionally has an impact on child node (Leu & Chang, 2013). For 
example, if technical errors occur (parent node), an accident may occur (child node) as seen in 
Figure 2.2. This figure also expresses the states [Occur(O), Does not occur (X)] and conditional 
probability tables for three variables or factors.  With this BBN in Figure 2.2, the question of 
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“what is the accident probability, given that technical errors occur?” is answered. By applying 
the equation (1), the answer can be calculated as follows: 










 = 58% 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Example of Bayesian belief network for risk analysis 
As shown in Figure 2.3, however, it is straightforward for Netica software to calculate the 
final outcome which is P(Accident occurs | Technical errors Occur), by selecting one state.  
 
Figure 2.3 Example of Netica for risk analysis, selecting one state. 
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 Furthermore, this powerful and intuitive software helps us to get easily the final outcome 
given probabilistic relationships between two factors in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4 Example of Netica for risk analysis with overall probabilistic relationships 
2.2.2 Materials 
In order to compute the accident probability by the introduction of cobots through BBN, 
fundamental data needs to be available. However, this data is scarce everywhere due to cobots’ 
growing popularity and accident cases are difficult to find. Given this context, this paper will 
analyze the occupational injuries and fatalities due to industrial robots in the Republic of Korea. 
This trend helps to understand the characteristics of the cobot-related accidents because the 
category of industrial robots includes traditional industrial robots as well as newer collaborative 
robots. Consequently, this analysis allows for examination of critical factors that impact the 
occupational injuries by cobots.   
Next, the Occupational Safety and Health Company Survey (OSHCS) 20151, which is the 
national statistics of the Republic of Korea, is implemented regularly for other applied 
researches. This survey is used to provide empirical data that can be utilized to establish mid- to 
long-term occupational safety and health policy agenda. In this survey, the level of safety 
 
1 This questionnaire was developed based on EU OSHA’s survey of enterprises on new and emerging risks and 
European company survey by Eurofound. 
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training, safety management, implementation of risk assessment, and CEO’s safety interests in 
the manufacturing industry in the Republic of Korea have been investigated. This data plays a 
critical role in providing the probabilities that are considered as parent nodes. 
If child nodes are dependent on multiple parent nodes – which means there are multiple 
conditional probabilities given various conditions – it is reasonable to refer to the data from 
previous studies and apply a notional probability with assumptions.  
Lastly, in order to calculate the outcome that also relies on multiple child nodes, naïve 
Bayes classifier is adopted to obtain each conditional probability for estimating the likelihood of 
the accident by cobots, given various conditions. The naïve Bayes method employs Bayes’ 
theorem but assumes that factors are independent of each other. Even if independence is usually 
an unrealistic assumption, naive Bayes bear remarkably comparison with more elaborate 
classifiers in the practical point of view (Rish, 2001).  The following study has been conducted 





CHAPTER 3.    INJURIES AND FATALITIES OF INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS 
3.1 The status of OIIRs from 2009 from to 2018 in the republic of Korea 
The status of occupational injuries by industrial robots (OIIRs in the Republic of Korea 
has been analyzed with data approved as occupational injuries under the Industry accident 
Compensation Insurance Act (IACI Act) from 2009 to 2018. In detail, OIIRs were analyzed by 
dividing them into type of injuries, company size, working period, and work loss day to derive 
characteristics of OIIRs.  
3.1.1 The status of OIIRs by types of occupational injuries 
 Classification of the types of injuries are crush, fall from the heights, collision, struck by 
object, cutting/prick etc. Trend of OIIRs by the type of injuries can help derive significant factors 
about what type of injuries occurred the most. Types of OIIRs are assessed in the following 
order: crush (50.6%), collision (37.7%), struck by object (3.7%), fall from the height (3.4%), 
trip/slip (1.4%), and cutting/prick (1.1%). Two types of injuries - crush and collision - occupied 
roughly 88% of OIIRs. This is due to parts of the workers’ body becoming trapped between the 
moving parts of the robot, or were hit by the robot, resulting in rare fatalities. 
Table 3.1 Cases of OIIRs by type of occupational injuries 









Injuries by IRs 177 132 12 13 5 4 7 
Injuries in overall 
manufacturing industries 







Figure 3.1 Distribution of OIIRs by type of occupational injuries 
3.1.2 The status of OIIRs by company size 
To analyze the correlation between OIIRs and the size of company, the size of company 
is divided into 4 categories as seen in Table 3.2. In case of overall injuries in the manufacturing 
industry, Figure 3.2 shows that the smaller size of the company, the more injuries occur. This 
trend reflects the injuries by industrial robots in the past 10 years. This could be due to the fact 
that SMEs have limited safety budget and manpower, thus increasing the probability of injury. 
As a result, it is recognized that the size of workplace may affect the accident probability with an 
introduction of cobots. 
Table 3.2 Cases of OIIRs by company size  
Number of workers < 50 50~299 300 ~ 1,999 > 2000 Total 
Injuries by IRs 169 116 29 36 350 
Injuries in overall 
manufacturing industries 


















Figure 3.2 Distribution of OIIRs by company size  
 
3.1.3 The status of OIIRs by working period 
Workers’ proficiency is also one of the major factors that impact the injuries by industrial 
robots. The correlation between OIIRs and the proficiency of workers injured is analyzed 
through the analysis of the working period, defined as time spent working, of workers injured. 
Working period of workers injured by industrial robots has been analyzed in the following order: 
less than 1 year (48.0%) > 1 year ~ 3 years (17.7%), > 3 years ~ 5 years (6.6%). As can be seen 
in the two histograms, the occupational injuries of the two conditions dropped at approximately 
the same rate within 5 years. However, this trend over time varied between the two. Injuries in 
overall manufacturing industries decreased continuously while OIIRs remained stationary after 5 
years. It is important to note that injuries by industrial robots is a problem even for skilled workers. 
Table 3.3 Cases of OIIRs by working period  












Injuries by IRs 168 62 23 32 32 31 2 350 
Injuries in overall 
manufacturing industries 






10~49 50~299 300~1999 >2000




Figure 3.3 Distribution of OIIRs by working period 
3.1.4 The status of OIIRs by work loss day 
Table 3.4 shows the average work loss day of the two conditions. The average work loss 
days of all injuries in the manufacturing industry over the past decade totaled 280 days. On the 
other hand, the average work loss days of OIIRs was 671 days that were 2.4 times higher than 
that of injuries in overall manufacturing industry. This points out that the severity of injuries 
caused by an industrial robot is much more severe. In other words, it seems reasonable to say 
that an injury by industrial robots has a high chance to result in more days missed. 
 
Table 3.4 Cases of OIIRs by work loss day 
Year Ave. 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Injuries by IRs 671.33 724 829 528 995 247 697 994 683 345 721 
Injuries in overall 
manufacturing industries 










< 1Y 1Y~3Y 3Y~5Y 5Y~10Y 10Y~20Y >20Y Others




Figure 3.4 Distribution of OIIRs by work loss day 
 
3.1.5 The implications through the analysis of OIIRs 
An analysis on OIIRs over the past decade with four categories sheds light on the 
characteristics for injuries by the introduction of cobots. Firstly, major types of injuries would be 
crush and collision due to mainly abnormal contact between the driving robot attachments and 
the workers. Secondly, it is expected that the smaller size of company, the higher the number of 
injuries by cobots will occur. Next, the more working periods, the lower cobot-related accident 
probability. This generally means workers who have more working periods, have a higher 
chance to be well-trained for safety. Therefore, the level of safety training would be one of the 
major factors to impact on the accident probability by cobots. Lastly, the average work loss days 
of OIIRs were 2.3 times higher than that of entire injuries in overall manufacturing. This trend 
predicts the cobots’ case to some extent. However, with the help of sophisticated safety-control 
functions such as safety monitored stop or distance and speed control, the strength of injuries by 






Ave. 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Injuries by IRs Injuries in overall manufacturing industry
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3.2 The status of fatalities by industrial robots 
An analysis of 28 fatalities2 due to industrial robots (FIRs) from 2009 to 2018 was 
investigated and the major categories for this analysis were the sector in manufacturing industry 
where the fatality occurred, working period of worker died, installation of safety fence and 
proper safety measures for an entrance, and type of tasks.  
3.2.1 The status of sector of industry involving FIRs 
Transport machinery manufacturing industry had the highest frequency of FIRs, which 
resulted in 12 cases (42.9%) and two cases (7.1%) that took place in the general machinery and 
metal industry respectively. In the category defined as “other”, the electric device manufacturing 
and food industry each had one fatality. Among these industries referred, the transportation and 
general machinery manufacturing industries are related to the automobile industry which 
generally uses many industrial robots in the Republic of Korea. 






Metal  Chemical  Others Total 
Fatalities by IRs 12 2 2 2 10 28 
Ratio (%) 42.86 7.14 7.14 7.14 35.71 100 
3.2.2 The status of working period involving FIRs 
Table 3.6 shows that 10 cases (35.7%) of the fatalities occurred in workers with less than 
one year of their working period. This indicates that shorter working periods are more likely to 
result in the high chance to exposure for the fatality. However, one particular thing is that 5 cases 
occurred over 10 years. This means that FIRs could occur unexpectedly for even skilled workers.  
 
2   According to the section 4 of Korean OSH act, fatality is defined as ① an accident in which one or more workers have been 
killed, ② an accident in which two or more workers are injured simultaneously, requiring three months or more with care, ③ an 
accident in which more than 10 people were injured or ill at the same time.  
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Table 3.6 Working periods involving FIRs  
Year < 1 Yr. 
1 Yr. ~  
3 Yr. 
3 Yr. ~  
5 Yr. 
5 Yr. ~  
10 Yr. 
> 10 Yr. 
Unable to 
check 
Fatalities by IRs     10        8       3      1       5     1 
Ratio (%) 35.71 28.57 10.71 3.57 17.86 3.57 
3.2.3 The status of installation of safety fence and safety measures for entrances  
Table 3.7 shows that 4 FIRs have been caused by the installation of industrial robot cells 
without safety fence. Out of the 24 cases of installed safety fences, 9 cases were found to install 
improperly safety interlock for the entrance of safety fences and 1 case was found not to have 
safety interlock for the entrance installed at all as shown in Table 3.8. This means that workers 
could access into a robot zone during operation which is directly connected to the high chance of 
fatality. 
Table 3.7 Installation status of physical safety fence 
Type Installed Not installed 
Fatalities by IRs     24       4 
Ratio (%) 85.71 14.29 
Table 3.8 Installation status of safety interlock for entrance of physical safety fence 
  With this analysis, we can deduce the probability of human errors, organizational errors, 
and technical errors to occur given accident. P (human error | accident, H|A) would be derived 
from the portion of fatality happened although safety fences and interlock for the entrance 
installed properly. P (organizational error | accident, O|A) would also be derived from the portion 






Not installed Unable to check 
Fatalities by IRs        13     9      1      1 
Ratio (%)   54.16 37.5 4.17 4.17 
17 
 
(Technical error | accident, T|A) would be derived from the portion of fatality happened when 
safety fences installed properly but safety interlock was installed improperly and thus it failed to 
function properly. These probabilities will be applied for the calculation of conditional 
probabilities. 
Table 3.9 Guidance probabilities of three main errors given accident 
Type P(H|A) P(O|A) P(T|A) 
Ratio (%) 
13 cases /27 cases 
= 48.15 
5 cases / 27 cases 
= 18.52  
9 cases / 27 cases 
= 33.33 
3.2.4 The status of types of tasks involving FIRs 
According to the analysis of the type of tasks of FIRs as seen in Table 3.10, 18 cases 
(64.3%) occurred during repairing of industrial robot systems or related device in industrial robot 
cells, 8 cases (28.6%) occurred during normal operation and 2 cases (7.1%) occurred during 
cleaning in industrial robot cells. In the past, many fatalities occurred during inputting programs 
or teaching robots, but there have been no fatalities during those actions in the last 10 years. It 
was believed that the fatalities during repairing and cleaning could be prevented by locking the 
startup switch with the key and managing the key separately or attaching a sign saying 
"Working” on the startup switch before starting the operation, generally called “Lock out tag out 
(LOTO)”. In other words, it is recognized that these kinds of risk can be eliminated from the 
educational and administrative measures such as safety management and training, as well as 
effective risk assessment. 
Table 3.10 Types of tasks involving FIRs  
Type Teaching  Normal operation Repairing Cleaning 
Fatalities by IR      0        8 18     2 




3.2.5 The implication through the analysis of FIRs 
An analysis on FIRs over the past decade also sheds light on the characteristics of severe 
injuries by the introduction of cobots. First of all, it is expected that there will be severe injuries 
caused by cobots in the automobile and general machinery manufacturing industries, due to 
many assembly and welding tasks. Secondly, the more working periods, the lower cobot-related 
fatality, which generally means workers who have more working periods, have a higher chance 
to be well-trained for safety. However, FIRs occurred unexpectedly even for skilled workers. 
Therefore, safety training such as refresher courses should be required for skilled workers. Next, 
proper installation of virtual safety fences is a critical factor to prevent the cobot-related 
accidents. In addition, the probabilities, which are P(H|A), P(O|A), and P(T|A), reflect the 
characteristics of the Korean situation. Lastly, it would be meaningful to say that severe 
accidents are expected to occur in non-routine tasks and thus effective safety training and 
management, as well as risk assessment should be embedded into the workplace. 
3.3 Characteristics factors leading to OIIRs and FIRs 
From the analysis of OIIRs, the major types of injuries are crush and collision and the 
level of safety training based on working period is an important factor to be expected to affect 
the annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots. Furthermore, it is predicted that 
company size impacts the probability of accidents due to the different capacity by size to deal 
with safety issues. OIIRs are three times higher than the rate of the occupational injuries of entire 
manufacturing industry in case of skilled workers over 20 years of work experience. The analysis 
of FIRs also shows this tendency. Therefore, training such as refresher courses should be 
required for skilled workers. From the analysis of FIRs, about 71.4% of FIRs occurred during the 
non-normal operating condition. OSHA guideline for robotics safety (STD 01-12-002) also points 
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out that many robot accidents usually do not occur during routine tasks but instead, during 
programming, maintenance, repair, testing, setup, or adjustment. In other words, this kind of risk 
can be eliminated with educational and administrative measures, such as proper safety 
management and training, as well as effective risk assessment. According to ISO TS 15066, risk 
assessment for cobots should include not only cobot itself, but also control systems and safety 
devices such as virtual fences. 
Furthermore, proper installation of safety fences and safety interlock for entrances of 
safety fences that affect human errors and technical errors should not be overlooked. In case of 
cobots, it's just that physical safety fences turn into virtual safety ones. Improper installation can 
lead to serious hazards depending on the amount varied from the original design. Due to this, 
design, installation requirements, and equipment layout of a robot need to be aligned with the 
codes and guidelines required by the manufacturer. Therefore, regulatory safety certification at 
installation is an effective method to prevent accidents, due to the fact that robots are able to 
adapt to their environmental conditions. In the era of popularization in smart factory, Korean 
government is preemptively considering whether the safety certification system for cobots will 
be introduced or not. In addition, OSHA guideline (STD 01-12-002) suggests that the prevention 
for control errors, mechanical and electronical failures directly impacts the accident probability. 
In this study, it is collectively called system reliability. 
Research by Heinrich’s industrial accident prevention (Heinrich, 1941), suggests that 
unsafe acts and conditions are major causes for industrial accidents. Most of the unsafe acts 
result from human errors, and most of the unsafe conditions result from technical errors such as 
mechanical and physical hazards. This theory is quite an outdated but has suggested simplistic 
and linear concept about how to approach the accident.  
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Poor safety management causes the majority of accidents (Johnson, Ashley 2001). 
Moreover, effective leadership plays a critical role in improving safety performance in high-risk 
working environments (Flin & Yule, 2004). The starting point of safety leadership is the CEO’s 
safety interest. Lastly, unlike industrial robots, the number of cobots is expected to affect the 
accident probability due to the high chance of collision between them.   
With these significant factors and implications from the analysis and literature review, 
the characteristic factors leading to the occupational injuries and fatalities is introduced by the 
collaborative robots in Table 3.11. 
 Table 3.11 Major characteristics to occur industrial robot accident and cobot accidents  
 
Characteristics of Industrial robots 
 
Characteristics of Collaborative robots 
Safety training  Safety training  
Type of tasks Type of tasks 
Safety management (Lock out Tag out) Safety management 
CEO’s safety interest CEO’s safety interest 
Company size Company size 
System reliability System reliability 
Risk assessment Risk assessment 
Proper installation 
 - Physical fences 
 - Fool-proof, fail-safe device 
Proper installation 
 - Virtual fences 
 - Fool-proof, fail-safe device 
 
Regulatory safety certification at 
installation 
 Number of collaborative robots  
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CHAPTER 4.    RISK MODEL  
The risk model by the introduction of cobots can be depicted as a Bayes belief network to 
aid in conceptualizing the complex interrelationships among factors. Figure 4.1 depicts several 
interrelated factors affecting the annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots. 
 
Figure 4.1 Risk (BBN) model of accident prediction by the introduction of cobots  
 
This model includes two decision nodes, twelve uncertainty nodes: three mid-parent 
nodes (human, organizational and technical errors), eight parent nodes, and one child node 
(outcome) which is the annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots. It is assumed 
that the annual accident probability of cobots without any conditions is the average accident rate 
of the Republic of Korea in 2018. With the prior probability, the model estimates mainly whether 
the post annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots increases or not under those 




In this paper, the views of two decision makers have been considered. One is an 
employer who makes the decision about how many cobots invest. The other is a policymaker 
who takes charge of the occupational safety in the government’s body. Therefore, this model 
contains two decision nodes: 1) number of cobots from the employer’s view and, 2) regulatory 
safety certification at installation from the policymaker’s view. 
4.1.1 Number of cobots 
If cobots become popular in industrial robotics, workers are likely to work with more 
than one cobot in work cells, in order to maximize productivity. This tendency can affect the 
frequency of the occupational injuries by collaborative robots (OICRs). This is because workers 
and cobots are more likely to bump into each other, leading to a higher chance of slips, lapses, 
and mistakes to occur. This is a result of mainly human and organizational errors, as the number 
of cobots increases in a shared workplace. In case of technical errors, however, because only 
products securing system reliability by international standards were distributed, it is assumed that 
this node does not affect technical errors. In this study, there are three choices for the number of 
cobots being “one”, “two”, and “three”. Each option refers to the number of cobots per working 
cell. It is assumed that each cell is designed for one worker.  
4.1.2 Regulatory safety certification 
The major cause of FIRs is majorly attributed to incomplete installation of industrial 
robot cells such as physical safety guards or interlock safety devices at every entrance. This 
allows for a worker to move into robot cell without pausing the robot. This enables workers to 
violate the safety procedures, being overconfident. Currently, there is no legal system to check 
the safety performance of industrial robots as well as collaborative robots at the installation stage 
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in the republic of Korea. Therefore, it is believed that a regulatory safety certification system will 
be necessary to ensure the safety of cobots. This regulatory system can reduce the occurrence of 
human and technical errors through proper installation. Nowadays, the Korean government is 
taking a huge consideration of whether the system will be implemented. This node can affect the 
uncertainty of proper installation. This node has two decisions: “implemented” or “not 
implemented”. It is assumed that the probability of proper installation is 99.9% when the system 
is implemented.  
4.2. Uncertainties 
The eleven uncertainties depicted in the network in Figure 4.1, are sorted into three major 
categories of human, organizational and technical errors which act as mid-parent nodes. This 
category was improved to be more appropriate for the complex working environment, based on 
the concept of Harvey’s 3Es - Education, Enforcement and Engineering - to affect the accident 
probability of cobots (Julien H. Harvey, 1946). Even though this concept is a little old-fashioned, 
it is still widely used for occupational safety and health approaches to prevent occupational 
injuries and illnesses. The remaining eight uncertainties which act as parent nodes affect each 
mid-parent node.  
4.2.1 Human errors 
Heinrich (1941) suggested that most of industrial accidents came from unsafe act that 
result from human errors. Research by Senders and Moray (1991) defined that human error 
means something has been done that was "not intended by the actor; not desired by a set of rules 
or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its acceptable limits”. According to 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), there are three types of human error: slips, lapses, and 
mistakes. Both slips (generally called “commission error”) and lapses (generally called 
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“omission error”) occur in very familiar tasks which can occur without much conscious attention, 
whereas mistakes are attributable to decision-making failures. There should be many causes 
leading to human errors in the worksites such as poor design, distraction, time pressure, 
workload, and communication systems. Although detailed considerations along these causes are 
meaningful for an entire body of research, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we 
intend to apply four factors found from the analysis of OIIRs and FIRs will be applied. There are 
four uncertainties to be concerned: safety training, risk assessment, proper installation, and type 
of tasks. The probability of human error assumes 0.003 in case of “P (safety training: high, risk 
assessment: implemented, type of task: routine, proper installation: proper)” which is general 
human error rate for an act performed incorrectly (Kirwan. B., 1994). When it comes to each 
conditional probability3, Table 4.1 was applied. 
 











High              (0) Implemented              (0)    Routine              (0) Proper           (0) 1             (0) 
Medium (+0.025) Not implemented (+0.05) Non-routine (+0.05) Improper (+0.05) 2    (+0.025) 
Low         (+0.05)        3      (+0.05) 
 
4.2.1.1 Safety training 
OSHA argues that education and training plays a critical role in informing workers and 
managers about worksite hazards and controls so they can work safely and productively. In 
addition, the more years of working periods, the lower accident probability found from the 
 
3 Book (Robot system reliability and safety, 2015) by Dhillon stated that that roughly 20% of industrial accidents 
with robots resulted from human error. Therefore, the sum of four uncertainty factors’ probability is 20% with the 




analysis on OIIRs. It generally means that workers who have more working periods, have a 
higher chance to be well-trained for safety. This is attributed to the fact that employers regularly 
provide a safety education – over 6 hours per quarter - for the employee according to Article 31 
of the Korean OSH act. Furthermore, the introduction of cobots will make the integrated system 
more complicated. Therefore, safety education can increase the awareness surrounding risks such 
as collision and trapping from cobots and in turn reduce the chance of human errors. The 
outcomes of this uncertainty are “high, medium and low”. From the previous study of KOSHA 
(Junseok, 2012), the level of safety training in the workplace where industrial robots are 
investigated as shown in Table 4.2. High means “safety training regularly”. Medium means 
“safety training if necessary”. Low means “no training”. The same distribution in case of cobots 
was assumed.   
 Table 4.2 The ratio of the level of safety training  
Low  Medium High 
0.077 0.224 0.699 
4.2.1.2 Type of tasks 
As being similar to the FIRs cases, most of the accidents by cobots are expected to be 
non-routine tasks. From the analysis of FIRs, it shows that 71.4% of FIRs occurred during the 
non-normal operating condition. Research by Brazendale (1988), non-routine tasks give a high 
chance of human errors occurring because of unfamiliarity and unpredictability. The outcomes of 
this uncertainty are “routine” and “non-routine”. The portion of routine and non-routine task was 





Table 4.3 The ratio of routine and non-routine tasks 
Routine  Non-routine 
0.93 0.07 
4.2.1.3 Risk assessment 
According to ISO TS 15066, risk assessment for cobots should include not only the cobot 
itself, but also control systems and safety devices such as virtual fences. However, ISO 15066 
refers to ISO 10218-2 based on the ISO 12100 for risk assessment and mitigation of safety 
machinery for designers. This means that this standard does not completely cover hazards at the 
installation and usage stage. In order to implement an effective risk assessment for users, a high 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL; IEC 62061) and/or Performance Level (PL; ISO 13849-1) for 
functional safety need to be applied. Unlike other parent nodes, this node affects two mid-
parents’ node which are human and technical errors. The outcomes of this uncertainty are 
“implemented” or “not implemented”. From the OSHCS 2015 in Korea, 83.3% of workplaces in 
the manufacturing industry implemented risk assessment systems under the article 4.1 of Korean 
OSH act as shown in Table 4.4. The same distribution was assumed with cobots.  
Table 4.4 The ratio of the implementation of risk assessment 
Implemented Not implemented 
0.833 0.167 
4.2.1.4 Proper installation  
Cobots and coordinate systems should be installed according to the law or international 
safety standards because the design, requirements, and layout of equipment, utilities, and 
facilities can lead to hazards if they are not correctly installed. For instance, although there is no 
function of safety monitored stop in co-existence or collaboration zone, a worker might make a 
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wrong judgment to try and enter a cell without caution. Therefore, proper installation is one of 
the major factors that affects human error. This study also considers proper installation as the 
factor of technical errors because if not, the virtual cage for safety has a chance to fail to function 
properly. Therefore, this node can affect two errors - human and technical errors – like the case 
of the node for risk assessment. The outcomes of this uncertainty are proper and improper. From 
the OSHCS 2015, 90.3% of the interviewees replied that preventative measures under the article 
25 of Korean occupational safety and health act were completely applied at workplaces where 
hazardous machinery equipment, such as industrial robots, were installed. It is applied that the 
ratio of the cobots’ case also has the same distribution. 
Table 4.5 The ratio of proper and improper installation of cobots 
Proper Improper 
0.903 0.097 
4.2.2 Organizational errors 
Under the article 5 of Korean OSH act, employers have a responsibility to provide a safe 
work environment and improve working conditions so as to prevent occupational injuries and 
illnesses. Therefore, the CEO’s safety interest based on employers’ responsibility is crucial to 
implement an effective safety management system of occupational safety and health program 
that is encouraged by Korea occupational safety and health agency (KOSHA). Moreover, the 
degree of organizational ability to manage OSH issues generally depends on the size of the 
company because of safety budget and manpower. In this category, there are three uncertainties: 
safety management, CEO’s safety interest, and the size of the company. The probability of 
organizational errors assumes 0.003 in case of “P (safety management: high, CEO’s interest: 
high, company size: greater than 300)” which is the same probability of human error. When it 
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comes to each conditional probability4, the probability following Table 4.6 was applied. 







Number of  
Cobots 
High                 (0) High                  (0)  Greater than 300     (0)  1                    (0) 
Medium    (+0.033) Medium     (+0.033)  50 ~ 299          (+0.033)   2            (+0.033) 
Low          (+0.066) Low     (+0.066)  1~49                (+0.066)           3            (+0.066) 
4.2.2.1 Safety management 
On the basis of the accident analysis of FIRs, 27 workplaces where fatality occurred had 
a proper safety procedure such as Lock Out/Tag Out (LOTO) 5. However, these tragic fatalities 
happened because the safety procedure was superficial, which implies safety management was 
insufficient and did not work with a chemical bond. Therefore, safety management works to 
reduce accidents caused by cobots. The outcomes of this uncertainty are high, medium, low. 
High means “well built-in”. Medium means “somehow built-in”. Low means “rarely built-in or 
needed”. From the OSHCS 2015, the level of safety management was below Table 4.7. The 
same distribution like the case of cobots was assumed. 
 
      Table 4.7 The ratio of the level of safety management  
High  Medium Low 
0.153 0.81 0.037 
 
4 The sum of three uncertainties’ probability is 20% with the same level of contribution as the case of human error. 
Generally speaking, human and organizational error is a result of interaction by two major factors. Environmental 
factors are not considered in the scope section of this study - and thus affect the occurrence of accident together. For 
clarity, the probability of organizational error is assumed the same as that of human error. In case of number of 
cobots, the same amount of contribution is applied for the objective research. 
5 OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.147 for control of hazardous energy, or lockout/tagout (LOTO), is used to prevent 
unexpected startup of equipment, and thus decrease the amount of injuries from harm during maintenance. 
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4.2.2.2 CEO’s safety interest 
In manufacturing environments, effective leadership is used in order to increase the 
safety performance of workers in high-risk situations. (Flin & Yule, 2004). Safety leadership is 
projected at the level of the CEO’s safety’s interest. This is essential to show leadership and 
enable employees to energize their safety performance in a positive way. The outcomes of this 
uncertainty are high, medium, low. High means “strong interest for safety from CEO”. Medium 
means “Moderate interest for safety from CEO”. Low means “Rarely or no CEO’s safety 
interest”. From the OSHCS 2015, the level of CEO’s safety interest was below Table 4.8.  
 
 Table 4.8 The ratio of the level of CEO’s safety interest  
High Medium Low 
0.367 0.601 0.032 
4.2.2.3 Company size 
Larger-size companies have usually lower rates of fatal injuries compared to smaller-size 
companies (Mendeloff, Ewing Marion Kauffman, & Kauffman, 2006). Recently, in the republic 
of Korea, this trend is becoming rigid because of the increase in outsourcing hazardous work 
from a contractor to a sub-contractor for cost reduction (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 
2015). Moreover, it is expected that cobots in SMEs will have higher relative vulnerability to 
occupational accidents compared to large-scale companies due to limited safety budget and 
manpower. In this node, the outcomes of this uncertainty are small, medium and large. From the 
national statistics (2018) from the Ministry of Employment and Labor in the Republic of Korea, 
the proportion of company size in the manufacturing industry is shown in Table 4.9.  
Table 4.9 The ratio of company size in the manufacturing industry  
Small (1 ~ 49) Medium (50 ~ 299) Large (greater than 300) 
0.9606 0.0370 0.0024 
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4.2.3 Technical errors 
The innovative technological advancements from physical cages to virtual cages with 
laser curtains, cameras and sensors for preventing collision and trapping, paved the way to make 
it possible for robots to share workplace with workers. Unlike the accident case of industrial 
robots, with the help of the state-of-art intrinsic safety system, the injuries and fatalities from 
cobots are expected to decrease. However, system reliability is still an important factor that 
affects the occurrence of occupational injuries by cobots. Effective implementation of the risk 
assessment and proper installation by the international standards has a significant impact on 
technical errors. Therefore, three factors can affect technical errors. In this category, there are 
three uncertainties: system reliability, risk assessment, proper installation. The probability of 
technical errors 0.001 in case of “P (system reliability: acceptable, risk assessment: implemented, 
proper installation: proper)” which is the required reliability of cobots system by the 
international standard (IEC 62061). When it comes to each conditional probability6, the 
probability following Table 4.10 was applied. 
Table 4.10 Three uncertainties and their impact on technical errors  
System reliability Risk assessment 
Proper installation 
(Virtual fences) 
Acceptable                        (0) Implemented                  (0)    Proper                   (0) 
Unacceptable               (+0.8) Not implemented      (+0.05) Improper          (+0.05) 
4.2.3.1 System reliability 
Cobots are designed for real-time interactions with humans in a shared place. This 
technical advancement requires complicated logics and hardware reliability compared to 
 
6 It is applied that the most contributable factor was system reliability in technical errors which is directly connected 
to occur the accident in the workplace, if it happens. As a result, the probability occurrence of technical errors 
increases up to 80% in case of unacceptable system reliability. The rest of two, risk assessment and proper 
installation were considered as the same level of contributors like the case of human errors. 
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industrial robots (Maurtua, Ibarguren, Kildal, Susperregi, & Sierra, 2017). According to the 
research on Perrow (1994), more complex logics has a chance to increase dysfunctional 
interactions among system components which is called “system accidents”.  In addition, faults of 
safety devices, sensors, and control panels of cobot system (electrical and mechanical failures) is 
directly associated with the occurrence of the accident by cobots.  
However, these failures should not be improved in the stage of usage or installation but in 
the stage of design and manufacturing. It was assumed that all of cobot manufacturers follow 
international standards such as ISO 15066, 10218-1,2 and IEC 62061 etc. According to IEC 
62061, cobot manufacturers should satisfy all requirements over Safety integrity level (SIL) 2 for 
selling their products.  The probability of failure on demand (PFD), corresponding to SIL 2 is 
10−3< x <10−2 of low demand mode. Therefore, the probability of hardware failure is 0.001 as 
shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 The reliability of cobots and cobot system 
4.3. Outcome  
The estimated annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots is affected by 
three major categories: human, organizational, and technical errors. Table 4.12 shows the eight 
conditional probabilities for that are inputted into the Netica Software in order to be computed. 








Table 4.12 Eight accident probabilities given each condition for outcome node 
① P (accident | human error (o) ∩ organizational error (x) ∩ technical error (x)) = 0.13747 
② P (accident | human error (x) ∩ organizational error (o) ∩ technical error (x)) = 0.00353 
③ P (accident | human error (x) ∩ organizational error (x) ∩ technical error (o)) = 0.07902 
④ P (accident | human error (o) ∩ organizational error (o) ∩ technical error (x)) = 0.24588 
⑤ P (accident | human error (o) ∩ organizational error (x) ∩ technical error (o)) = 0.88749 
⑥ P (accident | human error (x) ∩ organizational error (o) ∩ technical error (o)) = 0.14931 
⑦ P (accident | human error (o) ∩ organizational error (o) ∩ technical error (o)) = 0.94164 
⑧ P (accident | human error (x) ∩ organizational error (x) ∩ technical error (x)) = 0.6E-8 
 
4.3.1 Computation of conditional probabilities with naïve Bayes 
Naïve Bayes assumes that factors are independent each other and thus evidence or marginal 
probability can be divided into independent parts. For example, the annual accident probability 
given that all of three errors occur can be expressed as the following equation. 
=  
𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠) 
𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠) +  𝑃(𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠) 
 
=  
𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
{ 𝑃(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) +
𝑃(𝑛𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠|𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) }
 
             Therefore, this equation requires a P(A) which is the marginal probability. Accident 
probability “P(A)” is assumed that it would occur as much as the average occupational accident 
rate of the republic of Korea. In 2018, the average occupational accident rate of the republic of 
Korea was 0.54%. In case of likelihood such as P(human errors | accident), P(organizational 
errors | accident) and P(technical errors | accident), calculated from the status of installation of 
safety fence and safety measures for entrances, in the analysis on FIRs are applied. There are six 
likelihoods depicted in Table 4.13.  
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Table 4.13 Six probabilities given that accident occurs  
P(human error | accident, H|A)           = 0.4815 P(no human error | accident, ~H|A)               = 0.5185 
P(organization error | accident, O|A)  = 0.1852                P(no organization error | accident, ~O|A)    = 0.8148 
P(technical error | accident, T|A)        = 0.3333                P(no technical error | accident), ~T|A)         = 0.6667 
In addition, P (human errors | no accident) is assigned 0.01 which is “human error in a 
routine operation where care is required” from the book that is “A guide practical human 
reliability assessment” written by Barry Kirwan. P (organizational error | no accident) is applied 
0.1 that “supervisor does not recognize the operator’s error” from the book that is “A guide 
practical human reliability assessment” written by Barry Kirwan. In case of P (technical error | 
no accident), the probability of safety integrity level (SIL) 2 from the IEC 62061 is 0.01 as 
shown in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14 Six probabilities given that accident does not occurs  
P(human error | no accident, H|~A)             = 0.01 P(no human error | no accident, ~H|~A)           = 0.99 
P(organization error | no accident, O|~A)      = 0.1                P(no organization error | no accident, ~O|~A)    = 0.9 
P(technical error | no accident, T|~A)          = 0.01                P(no technical error | no accident, ~T|~A)        = 0.99 
 
With these values, eight posterior probabilities have been computed below:  
   ① P(accident | human error(o) ∩ organizational error(x) ∩ technical error(x)) 
      = P(A | H∩~O ∩~T) ⩭   
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
    
                                         = 
0.4815∗0.8148∗0.6667∗0.0054
0.4815∗0.8148∗0.6667∗0.0054+0.01∗0.9∗0.99∗0.9946
   




  ② P(accident | human error(x) ∩ organizational error(o) ∩ technical error(x)) 
      = P(A | ~H∩O∩~T) ⩭ 
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(~𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
   




                                        = 0.00353 = 0.353% 
  ③ P(accident | human error(x) ∩ organizational error(x) ∩ technical error(o)) 
    = P(A | ~H∩~O∩T) ⩭  
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(~𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
   
                                        =   
0.5185∗0.8148∗0.3333∗0.0054
0.5185∗0.8148∗0.3333∗0.0054+0.99∗0.9∗0.01∗0.9946
   
                                             = 0.07902 = 7.902% 
  ④ P(accident | human error(o )∩ organizational error(o) ∩ technical error(x)) 
    = P(A | H∩O∩~T) ⩭  
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
   
                                        =   
0.4815∗0.1852∗0.6667∗0.054
0.4815∗0.4∗0.1852∗0.6667∗0.0054+0.01∗0.1∗0.99∗0.9946
   
                                        = 0.24588 = 24.588% 
   ⑤ P(accident | human error(o) ∩ organizational error(x) ∩ technical error(o)) 
    = P(A | H∩~O∩T) ⩭ 
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
   
                                         =   
0.4815∗0.8148∗0.3333∗0.0054
0.4815∗0.8148∗0.3333∗0.0054+0.01∗0.9∗0.01∗0.9946
    
                                           = 0.88749 = 88.749% 
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   ⑥ P(accident | human error(x) ∩ organizational error(o) ∩ technical error(o)) 
    = P(A | ~H∩O∩T) ⩭  
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(~𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
    
                                     =   
0.5185∗0.1852∗0.3333∗0.0054
0.5185∗0.1852∗0.3333∗0.0054+0.99∗0.1∗0.01∗0.9946
    
                                     = 0.14932 = 14.932% 
   ⑦ P(accident | human error(o) ∩ organizational error(o) ∩ technical error(o)) 
   = P(A | H∩O∩T) ⩭  
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
    
                                  =   
0.4815∗0.1852∗0.3333∗0.0054
0.4815∗0.1852∗0.3333∗0.0054+0.01∗0.1∗0.01∗0.9946
    
                                      = 0.94165 = 94.165% 
  ⑧ P(accident | human error(x) ∩ organizational error(x) ∩ technical error(x)) 
    = P(A | ~H∩~O∩~T) ⩭  
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(~𝐻|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|𝐴)∗𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(~𝐻|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑂|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝑇|~𝐴)∗𝑃(~𝐴)
  =  




                                                = 0.00000006=0.000006% 
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CHAPTER 5.    RESULTS 
As a result of Netica software with the decision “one cobot” and “No implementation of 
regulatory safety certification”, the chance of accident occurrence by introduction of cobots is 
0.66 as shown below in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Bayesian belief network of the annual accident probability by cobots using Netica 
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Regarding other decision nodes, Netica software shows the results in each state below Table 5.1. 






does not implement 
1 0.52% 0.66% 
2 0.94% 1.09% 
3 1.37% 1.54% 
It shows that the estimated annual accident probability increases as the number of cobots 
increases, specifically, from one (0.66%) to three (1.54%), given that safety certification is not 
implemented. The introduction of the safety certification system has a positive effect on 
decreasing the annual accident probability from 0.66% (if not implemented) to 0.52% (if 
implemented) with one cobot by directly affecting the ratio of proper installation from 90.3% to 
99.9% in Figure 5.1.  
Regarding the three main errors, organizational errors have the most frequent probability 
(12.0%) as shown in Figure 5.1. In terms of impact, however, human errors have the largest 
impact on annual accident probability as shown in Table 5.2 due to large fluctuation between the 
lowest outcome: 0% occurs selected and the highest outcome: 100% occurs selected. 
Table 5.2 The impact level of three main errors for the annual accident probability 
Three categories 
Estimated annual accident probability 
The lowest7 The highest8 Variance 
Human errors 0.15% 17.5% 17.35 
Organizational errors 0.57% 1.31%   0.74 
Technical errors  0.47% 14.5% 14.03 
 
 
7 The probability when selected that the outcome has not fully occurred in the category  




CHAPTER 6.    SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Assumptions on how different factors interact with one another allow for probabilities to 
be based on these assumptions. Sensitivity analysis allows researchers to see how these factors 
interact with one another, and relies on these assumptions and measure the impacts of 
fluctuations by changing the inputs of each factor (Stallard, Mackenzie, & Peters, 2018). The 
Bayesian belief network diagram is able to extrapolate to what extent changing inputs will have 
on target value.  Figure 6.1 shows that the variance of accident probability as each factor moves 
from the best condition to the worst condition while the other factors are fixed. The outcome is 
based on one cobot installed with no safety certification system. For instance, if safety training is 
fully high, the annual accident probability is 0.51%, if fully low, it is 1.30% as seen in Figure 
6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1 Sensitivity analysis for the annual accident probability with one cobot installed and 




As shown in Figure 6.1, the factor that has the largest fluctuation on the outcome is 
system reliability. If system reliability is unacceptable, the probability of accident occurrence 
increases up to 9.15%. However, the level of system reliability has the limitations for 
improvement in usage or installation stages, but not as many in the stages of design and 
manufacturing. It was assumed in this paper that cobots were distributed only if they met 
international standards such as ISO 15066, 10218-1,2 and IEC 62061 for system reliability. Due 
to this, this paper is inconclusive to say that safety reliability has the greatest impact on the 
accident probability.    
The next largest variable factors are proper installation and risk assessment. If installation 
is improper, the probability of accident occurrence increases up to 1.97% and the impacts of 
fluctuations from the best state and the worst state is 1.45%. If risk assessment is not fully 
implemented, the outcome increases up to 1.85% and the impacts of fluctuations from the best 
state to worst state is 1.43%. 
On the other hand, three factors belonging to organizational errors are measured with 
relatively small variability. It is estimated that the portion of P(O|A) is correspondingly small 
compared to P(H|A), P(T|A) and also P(O|~A) is correspondingly big compared to P(H|~A), 
P(T|~A). This is explained by organizational errors affecting accident probability, but they may 
have indirect effects on the chance of accident occurrence which means that human and technical 
errors can cause occupational injuries to occur while organizational errors may play a role in a 





CHAPTER 7.    DISCUSSION 
The model suggested illustrates how a Bayes belief network is applied to predict an 
annual accident probability by the introduction of cobots. In order to validate the model, the 
question posed should be: “Are they safe or not?”. When using the comparative indicator of 
actual accident rate by industrial robots in Korea, the number of accidents by industrial robots 
can be shown, but the number of workers who work with industrial robots is not able to be 
determined. Therefore, researchers compared with the average accident rate of the entire 
manufacturing industry of Korea in 2018, at a percentage of 0.66%. This percentage is the same 
annual accident probability, when using one cobot and no safety certification system. This is 
classified as “average-risky”. However, with the help of technological advancement such as 
virtual safety fences using light curtains with vision camera and potential collision sensor, the 
accident intensity of cobots is expected to be lower than that of industrial robots. This is due to 
the decrease of speed and power before collision even if there is a collision with unexpected 
human behavior. From this point of view, cobots enable to decrease the work loss days, and thus 
conclude that cobots are safer than industrial robots, even though the number of accidents of 
cobots and industrial robots are very similar. 
Both the analysis on FIRs and the sensitivity analysis on the risk model indicate that 
proper installation is the most influential factor on the chance of accident occurrence. From the 
analysis of FIRs, the cause of 14 out of 28 cases was improper installation of safety fences and 
interlock for the entrance designed to keep the robot inaccessible to workers. This unsafe 
condition can allow workers to enter into a high-risk collision zone with no regard for safety. 
However, the primary risk mitigation strategy of industrial robots that is to separate the robot 
from workers is no longer applicable to cobots. The physical cage needs to be replaced with a 
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reliable, robust virtual cage to guarantee the safety of their human colleagues (Anne Jansen, 
2018). To install this cage safely including the total cobots system, the introduction of the safety 
certification would be an effective regulatory system at the government level. To realize this 
measure at the application level, the government needs to consider introducing qualifications or 
licenses related to the installation of cobots. This will raise the technological level for integrators 
installing cobots’ cells. Furthermore, only safety devices and equipment such as light curtain, 
vision camera and pressure sensors that have passed the safety certification system should be 
distributed to the industry.    
Another effective risk mitigation strategy derived from the risk model is to implement an 
effective risk assessment. The reduction of annual accident probability was significant between 
“implemented” and “not implemented”. However, it is believed that the concept of 
implementation for risk assessment should be changed as human-robot collaboration become 
more popular. While isolation from humans has been the best way to prevent accidents, from 
now on, it is necessary to control and cooperate with robots which are the main hazards to 
mitigate risk. One of the practical approaches is that risk assessment for cobots is not volume or 
static-based, but rather sequence or process-based that will change over time with the method 
recommended by ISO 15066.   
Next, the model points out the importance of safety measures during non-routine tasks 
such as programming, relocating and repairing. Due to the usability and versatility of cobots, 
cobots have a chance to conduct themselves of their various tasks in the workplaces and due to 
this, they will be frequently relocated and reprogrammed. Therefore, sophisticated safety training 
and procedure should be required. 
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Promoting safety awareness through a high-level of safety training for workers is 
important. From the model, the difference in the annual accident probability between high safety 
training and low safety training is 0.79%.  From the analysis of OIIRs, it was recognized that 
there has been a number of accidents for skilled workers who have worked for over 20 years. 
Therefore, training is required for new employees as well as refresher courses need to be for 
programmers, operators, and maintenance workers. 
Another implication is that cannot be overlooked is the CEO’s safety interest as well as 
the safety management system although their level of impact on the annual accident probability 
is relatively lower than other factors. This is attributed to the fact that leadership affects the 
formation of safety culture in the workplace. According to the KOSHA, the safety management 
system refers to a management system that combines the safety management priority based on 
CEO’s safety interest. Declaring safety management as a priority by the CEO is the foundation 
for this system. This functions through a plan-do-check-action cycle in a systematic and 
autonomous manner. High-level of the safety management system combined with the CEO’s 
high-level of safety interest prevents accident by the introduction of collaborative robots. 
It should not be overlooked if the annual accident probability will increase as the number 
of cobots increase per cell. In this study, it was assumed that the risk will simply increase 
linearly with each condition. However, there would be many factors to affect risk in real 




CHAPTER 8.    CONCLUSION 
The demand for collaborative robots is increasing rapidly in the era of 4th industrial 
revolution (Badri, Boudreau-Trudel, & Souissi, 2018). In the line with this trend, the 
occupational injuries by cobots also is regrettably expected to increase. In this respect, it is 
believed that this article is one to initially attempt to suggest a BBN for the risk analysis for the 
introduction of cobots. This study has strived to obtain trustworthy probabilities through the 
analysis on OIIRs, FIRs and national statistics in the Republic of Korea. In addition to this data, 
notional data with renowned literature reviews, as well as the author’s experiences over the 10 
years of occupational safety and health field.  
With the timely attempt, the risk (BBN) model was developed based on the factors for the 
annual accident probability by cobots. This gave outcome of 0.66%, given one cobot and no 
regulatory safety certification. As the validating process, the outcome was compared with the 
average accident rate of entire manufacturing industry of Korea in 2018. Both were the same. It 
can be interpreted “average-risky” in terms of accident frequency, but in terms of the accident 
intensity, that of cobots is expected to be lower than that of industrial robots. This is due to well-
rounded and sophisticated safety system components and devices such as speed and force limit 
with virtual fence. Nonetheless, accident rate and intensity should never be ignorable. 
Through the risk analysis with BBN and sensitivity analysis, these outcomes 
demonstrated how important it is to identify the optimal strategies for mitigating accident by 
cobots. As the saying goes “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”, all measures 
mentioned in the discussion are vital to accident prevention. However, this paper focuses on 
three key measures to mitigate the risk by the introduction of cobots based on what is realistic 
and effective.  
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The first measure is cobots that have secured safety reliability are designed, produced, 
and distributed at the design and manufacturing stage. Not only should it be based on the result 
of the sensitivity analysis, but it should be done in accordance with the international standards 
such as ISO 15066, 10218-1,2 and IEC 62061. Even though this is out of the scope, this should 
be carried in a big picture view. 
The second measure is that regulatory safety certification system at installation is an 
urgent need in the government level. It has the greatest sensitivity of all of the measures, besides 
the system reliability, and its effect for the accident reduction is magnificent. 
Last but not least, implementing an effectual risk assessment following the international 
standards or regulations at the usage stage as enforced by the law and ISO 15066. This proactive 
measure helps workers alongside cobots to recognize and control hazards in various conditions, 
promote safety awareness, and finally reduce the cobot-related annual accident probability as 
well as costs. Consequently, this paper suggests an effectual concept for preventing the cobot-
related accident in the Republic of Korea as seen in Figure 8.1.  
 




CHAPTER 9.    FUTURE STUDY 
This study is one of the first attempts that suggest a BBN for the risk analysis by the 
introduction of cobots, this model should be reinforced further to include more factors and a 
complete set of decisions, mirroring actual situations in the future and take more consideration to 
use subjective probabilities through more robust data from expert group surveys or empirical 
experiments. 
These limitations also pointed toward a very powerful and useful approach using 
Bayesian belief network, based on subjective assessments with notional data. Further study needs 
to reflect and consolidate it with present limitations and other important considerations: cyber 
security risks, environmental risks (e.g. electromagnetic interference), cognitive factors, 
regulations, and stakeholder requirements. Moreover, automated guided vehicles called “mobile 
robots” which move on autonomous platforms are the next challenge for safety in the workplace. 
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